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Abstract 
The UK is moving into a new phase of energy governance which is characterised by 
significant demand for new investment to meet long term climate policy objectives and to 
address shorter term energy security challenges. This paper examines how contributions 
from the socio-technical systems approach can be operationalised to address the policy and 
societal challenge of large scale investments in low carbon energy infrastructure. Research 
on socio-technical transitions explores the dynamics of long term structural change in capital 
intensive systems such as energy, housing and water supply, seeking to redirect them 
towards more sustainable long term trajectories. Focusing on the UK electricity generation 
sector, the paper expands on three key low carbon investment challenges where 
socio-technical research can provide useful insights – 1) understanding long term uncertainty 
and investment risks; 2) avoiding technological lock-in; and 3) accelerating the diffusion of 
low carbon finance ‘niches’.       
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1 Introduction 
In order for low carbon energy transitions to be realised large scale and long term capital 
investment will be required in a range of new infrastructure assets. Infrastructure, in a 
general sense, refers to the material basis of socio-technical systems - power stations, rail 
networks, ports, airports, pipes and wires etc. This has always been an important public 
policy issue because infrastructure supports the delivery of essential societal services, such 
as power for electrical devices and mobility. Governments have historically played a central 
role in infrastructure investment because of the wider social and economic benefits that it 
brings, but also because securing investment in these assets requires a long term and 
consistent governance framework. The balance between public and private investment has 
varied, though, between different types of infrastructure and according to the relative 
dominance of different political views of the role of markets in economic decision-making. 
A strongly market-oriented framework for energy infrastructure investment has been 
followed in the UK since the early 1990s, with this model increasingly being followed in 
other countries. This reflects a view that markets for the delivery of societal services would 
bring about the incentives for private actors to invest in infrastructure assets, leading to 
greater economic efficiency and socially optimal outcomes. This model was strongly 
influenced by neo-classical economic thinking (Helm, 2003). However, this framework is 
increasingly challenged by the need for high levels of investment to meet other societal 
objectives of reducing carbon emissions and maintaining energy security, whilst maintaining 
affordability of energy services to consumers and businesses. In order to deal with these 
new complexities it is likely that a rebalancing of the relationship between governments and 
markets will be required (Pearson and Foxon, 2012). The energy policy framework which 
emerges will need to address a number of key questions: What kinds of policies can 
effectively mobilise finance and deliver low carbon forms of infrastructure investment? How 
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is uncertainty and investment risk managed by public and private actors? And how are long 
and short term policy objectives reconciled?  
The purpose of this paper is to explore the ways in which studies of socio-technical systems 
and their long term dynamics can provide useful insights which help to address these 
complex questions. The origins of the field can be traced back to the work of the historian of 
technology Thomas Hughes who charted the early emergence and expansion of ‘large 
technical systems’ (LTS) such as electricity supply (Hughes, 1983). Hughes and colleagues 
highlighted the role of pioneer ‘system builders’ such as Thomas Edison, and how, over 
time, these infrastructure develop a systemic character through a process of mutual shaping 
of the technical system and its wider social environment (Summerton, 1994, Coutard, 1999, 
Vleuten, 2004). More recent contributions have sought to account for the transformation of 
these now mature systems in the context of climate change, energy security and other 
drivers of change (Magnusson, 2012, Foxon, 2013). 
Both the historically orientated LTS approach and the transitions perspective are grounded 
in the wider field of technology studies which seeks to account for the social character and 
implications of technical change (Williams and Edge, 1996, Bolton and Foxon, 2014, 
Mackenzie and Wacjman, 1999). Unlike neo-classical economics, which has formed the 
intellectual basis for energy policy in the UK since the 1980s, strands of technology studies 
such as this view technical change as a dynamic non-linear process, where outcomes are not 
determined by markets, but shaped by a wider set of social processes. A systems framing is 
adopted in which the market is embedded in socio-technical ‘regimes’ which are alignments 
of institutions, infrastructures and actors which provide stability to and underpin the 
delivery of essential societal services. Central to the analysis is how fundamental and long 
term changes to regimes occur, focusing on the de-stabling effects of radical innovations 
which emerge from typically dispersed ‘niche’ spaces, and changes in wider socio-technical 
‘landscapes’, including macro level social, economic and technological trends (Rip and 
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Kemp, 1998, Geels, 2002b). Our purpose is not to undertake a systematic review of the 
entire body of socio-technical systems literature (For overviews see: Markard et al., 2012, 
Smith et al., 2010, van den Bergh et al., 2011, Vleuten, 2004), rather we draw selectively 
from key concepts and contributions to the field to consider specific areas where we believe 
socio-technical thinking can help to contribute to the low carbon investment debate.  
Although questions of finance and investment have not been an explicit focus of this field of 
research to date, though see (Geels, 2013), there has been some engagement with the 
issue, for example with a recent special issue of this journal focusing on the implications of 
the economic-financial crisis for the prospects of transitions to more environmentally 
sustainable systems (van den Bergh, 2013). While this has been highly relevant to the 
potential effects of changes at a macro or ‘landscape’ level (Antal and van den Bergh, 2013, 
Loorbach and Lijnis Huffenreuter, 2013), there is a need to understand in more depth how 
institutional realignments and policy changes influence infrastructure investments in 
specific contexts and in relation to individual socio-technical ‘regimes’ e.g. the electricity 
generation and supply regime. Through a number of illustrative examples the paper 
highlights how a more nuanced understanding of the complex interrelationships between 
long term technical change and social contexts, and the non-linear dynamics of innovation 
processes implicit in socio-technical studies can usefully inform policy debates in relation to 
low carbon investments.  
The main empirical focus of the paper is on the UK electricity generation sector. The need to 
provide adequate and appropriate forms of public financial support to incentivise high levels 
of private investment in power generation is currently framing the design of one of the main 
UK low carbon policies – Electricity Market Reform. Section 2 outlines the specific policy 
issues being debated in the UK. In section 3, we expand upon three areas in which 
socio-technical studies can contribute to an analysis of low carbon investment in this sector: 
1) framing and understanding uncertainty and investment risks through the articulation of 
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transition pathways, 2) emphasising long term time horizons and avoiding technological 
lock-in, and 3) accelerating the diffusion of low carbon finance ‘niches’. In section four we 
reflect on the contribution of socio-technical research to addressing the low carbon 
investment policy challenges and the limits of the approach. We highlight that the nature of 
the contribution is in providing systemic frameworks based on an understanding of the long 
term dynamics of infrastructure change, rather than instrumental and specific policy 
recommendations. We also note that high level systemic frameworks such as this do not 
provide in-depth insights into the political negotiation of different policy priorities and 
trade-offs being made. In the final section we draw key conclusions.  
2 The UK electricity sector – background and investment challenges 
We begin in this section by briefly outlining key aspects of the policy background to 
electricity sector transformation and low carbon investment in the UK. The UK, like many 
other industrialised nations, is currently facing the prospect of radical decarbonisation of its 
energy supply systems. The 2008 Climate Change Act set a legally-binding goal of reducing 
the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050, from 1990 levels, with intermediate 
carbon budgets to be set towards this goal, based on recommendations of an independent 
Committee of Climate Change (CCC). In its Fourth Carbon Budget report, the Committee 
(CCC, 2010) recommended that the UK should aim for a reduction in the carbon intensity of 
electricity generation from its current level of approximately 500 gCO2/kWh to around 50 
gCO2/kWh by 2030, as a key element of reducing the UK’s carbon emissions to this time
1. 
Particular emphasis has been placed on the electricity sector, because relative to other 
energy intensive areas of socio-economic activity, it is seen as likely to be cheaper and more 
                                                        
1 In 2011, the UK Parliament accepted the Committee’s recommendation for overall carbon emissions reductions 
for the period 2023-2027, but did not agree to set a specific reduction target for carbon intensity of electricity 
generation. 
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feasible to decarbonise electricity supply first due to the availability of alternatives (i.e. a 
range of renewables and nuclear power). Electricity generated from low carbon sources 
could then increasingly be used to meet other energy service needs for heating and 
transport2. (Speirs et al., 2010) 
Figure 1 below provides some background by showing the large coal, nuclear, combined 
cycle gas turbine (CCGT) generation plants and wind farms currently operating in the UK and 
the year they came onto the system. As can be seen, the vast majority of operating coal 
plants were constructed in the late 1960s/early 1970s and most of the UK’s existing nuclear 
investments took place during the 1970s and 80s when the system was operated by a state 
owned body, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 It should be noted that this view of an ‘all-electric future’ is not universally accepted. Some argue that there is 
too much emphasis on electrification, at the expense of potentially more effective means of decarbonisation of the 
heat and transport. For heat see: (Speirs et al., 2010) 
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Figure 1: Cumulative installed capacity (GW) of major power stations currently operating in the UK, with 
dates of installation (DECC, 2012a: data from table 5.11)
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Much of the investment made by private companies following privatisation and 
liberalisation reforms in the 1990s has been in lower capital cost and flexible CCGT (gas) 
plant. Despite the new investments in CCGTs and wind farms which have taken place over 
the past number of decades, the UK faces a potential ‘generation gap’ as many of the 
existing coal and nuclear plant shown in the figure will come off the system over the coming 
decade due to ageing plant and a lack of compliance with environmental legislation (DECC, 
2012b)4. This has led to concerns over a short term threat to energy security due to a 
                                                        
3 In the interests of clarity this figure does not include non CCGT gas-fired generation, oil and diesel-fired 
generation, small scale solar and CHP, along with and other renewables such as hydro and biomass. Total 
generating capacity connected to the UK transmission network in 2012 was in the region of 90GW. 
4 The Large Combustion Plant Directive requires large electricity generators to meet more stringent air quality 
standards as of Jan 2008. In many cases it will be too expensive for coal and oil plants to meet these standards and 
will therefore need to ‘opt out’ which means that they have to close by the end of 2015 or upon reaching 20,000 
hours of operation after 2008. DECC note that ‘By the end of 2015…around 8 GW of coal-fired power generation 
capacity closes due to the Large Combustion Plant Directive’. In the medium/longer term there is uncertainty as to 
what effect the EU’s Industrial Emissions Directive will have on coal plant closures. All but one of the UK’s 
nuclear fleet is due to close by 2023, with Sizewell B expected to close in 2035. There is a great deal of uncertainty 
as to the exact timing of plant closures, in the case of Nuclear plant life extensions have been granted in the past, 
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reduction in the level of spare capacity on the system - the capacity margin. The UK energy 
market regulator has recently estimated that the capacity margin could fall to about 4% by 
2015, from current levels of 14% (Ofgem, 2012).  
It is only since the introduction of a tradable obligation certificate programme, the 
Renewables Obligation (RO), in the early 2000s that significant levels of investment have 
taken place in renewable generation, primarily onshore wind farms. A notable feature of the 
UK approach has been the embedding of low carbon technology policy, such as the RO, in 
the day-to-day operation of energy markets. Broadly, this has meant that government is 
reluctant to interfere in the day-to-day operation of markets and influence the price levels 
for renewable output, rather it has set the quantity of low carbon generation (e.g. number 
of Renewable Obligation Certificates), and the price for this would be set by the market.  
A key underpinning of the ‘hands off’ relationship which emerged since the 1980s between 
government and the industry has been basic assumptions of neo-classical economic theory 
(Mitchell, 2008) - that investment is most efficiently made by private actors on the basis of 
price signals mediated through the energy markets. The main aim of this approach has been 
to utilise market based incentives to improve the efficiency of the previously state owned 
energy industries, and the focus of policy has been on short rather than long term objectives 
- to reduce the day-to-day operational costs of generating and distributing energy to end 
users. On these terms the UK programme of privatisation and liberalisation can perhaps be 
regarded as a success (Pollitt, 2008), however, the UK is moving into a new phase of energy 
governance where new investment to meet long term climate policy and energy security 
objectives is the main priority. 
A recently published UK Energy Research Centre working paper containing provisional 
                                                                                                                                                                            
and in the case of coal plant market factors such as the carbon price and international coal prices influence plant 
economics and therefore their running hours. 
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results of a study on financing the low carbon transition has sought to account for the 
investment costs of replacing this capacity and meeting climate change targets in the UK 
context (Blyth et al., 2014). Following a review of previously published estimates Blyth et al. 
note that “Across all the scenarios assessed in this study, the average amount of new 
capacity needing to be added to the system was 3.4GW each year up to 2020”, and in terms 
of investment, “Estimates of the size of the investment challenge range from the often 
quoted DECC / OFGEM5 figure of £110bn by 2020 (including transmission & generation) to 
much higher figures ranging from £200bn to over £300bn by 2030 from organisations such 
as National Grid, the Committee on Climate Change and London School of Economics” (p. 
iii). They highlight that “These figures are considerably higher than the build rate during the 
2000s which averaged 1.2 GW capacity added per year, with CAPEX of £1.1bn per year” 
(p.iii).  
Before its end of term in 2010 the then Labour government came to the conclusion that the 
current electricity market framework and associated support mechanisms, including the RO, 
did not provide sufficient incentive for private energy companies to invest in the levels of 
low carbon power generation needed to meet UK and EU renewable energy and carbon 
reduction targets. The deficiencies of the current market arrangement in relation to new 
low carbon investment was central to it setting in train an Electricity Market Reform (EMR) 
process, which was taken up by the new coalition government and is embodied in measures 
in the 2012 Finance Act (rising carbon floor price for power generation) and the 2013 Energy 
Act (contract for difference feed-in tariffs (CfD FITs), capacity mechanism and emissions 
performance standard). The likely success of these measures in stimulating high levels of 
investment in low carbon generation has been the subject of much debate, with some 
observers arguing that the EMR process was largely driven by the need to provide an 
                                                        
5 Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) 
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incentive framework to support the building of new nuclear power stations6 (Toke, 2011, 
Mitchell et al., 2011).  
The proposed CfD FIT model introduces long term contracts for low carbon generation 
(renewables, nuclear and CCS) whereby a ‘strike price’ will be predetermined for each of the 
qualifying technologies, and generators will be remunerated if the market price is below this 
level. A key difference with the previous approach is that price will not be solely an outcome 
of market operation, but to a large extent determined by government decision. This is 
clearly a deviation from neo-classical economic principles which is characterised by 
increasing government intervention in the energy market. It now seems that the UK 
government is reluctant to let prices rise to a level required for new low carbon investment 
because of concerns over the impact on the affordability of energy to consumers. Instead, it 
is seeking to intervene in the market to spread out the costs of investment over a longer 
timescale and to socialise elements of investment risk, which it is hoped will reduce the cost 
of borrowing for private investors. A key argument of this paper is that government needs 
to do more than help private investors realise a return on large scale low carbon 
investments by socialising risk, if it is to achieve its carbon reduction targets. There may be 
potential to utilise this window of opportunity to rethink the basis on which energy policy is 
made and implement a more long term orientated approach which is based on an 
assessment of options and innovation outcomes, rather than like-for-like replacement of the 
current system.   
                                                        
6 On 21 October 2013, the UK Government announced an agreement with French energy company EDF and its 
Chinese energy company partners to provide support for the building of a new 2 reactor 3.2 GW nuclear power 
station at Hinkley Point in South-West England, guaranteeing an index-linked price of at least £89.50 for each 
MWh generated for 35 years, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hinkley-point-c  
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3 Specific insights from socio-technical studies on low carbon 
investment in the UK power sector 
The purpose of this main body of the paper is to discuss ways in which insights from 
socio-technical studies can be deployed with a view towards contributing to a new energy 
policy framework which is better equipped to address the challenges of low carbon 
investment and long term transformation.  
The analysis is informed by two sources: The main source is work conducted as part of the 
‘Transition Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy’ research consortium which both authors 
have been involved with (Foxon, 2013, Foxon et al., 2010). The interdisciplinary consortium, 
comprising engineers, economists and social scientists, has been developing and analysing 
alternative socio-technical scenarios, or pathways, for the UK to achieve its 2050 climate 
targets. In constructing these alternative futures, the consortium has drawn upon 
socio-technical insights to develop more robust methodologies for the analysis of the long 
term scenarios in energy systems. In section 3.1 below, we argue that this approach can 
help to better frame uncertainty in energy transitions and to characterise associated 
investment risks.  
Our second source is a qualitative analysis of key policy documents relating to UK 
government’s approach to addressing the issue of power sector investment and a series of 
semi-structured interviews with actors in the energy/infrastructure investment chain; 
focusing on large institutional investors, investment managers, community scale investors, 
industry bodies and NGOs. To date 15 interviews have been conducted as part of a scoping 
study designed to develop a more in-depth understanding of the evolving relationship 
between energy policy and the investment community. A list of those interviewed is 
contained in an appendix at the end of this article. The interviews mostly provided 
background information to inform the main arguments in this paper. Our discussion in 
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section 3.3 of alternative investment models draws primarily from our discussions with 
those interviewees with knowledge of the institutional investment community (primarily 
interviews: 1, 5, 6, and 9), and three interviewees who are involved in the financing of small 
scale renewables (interviews: 3, 7 and 10). Subsequent publications will draw more 
specifically on the insights from these interviews.  
The sections below draw from an initial analysis of this material and the work of the 
Transition Pathways project where we identify a number of challenges to be confronted by 
policy makers in relation to low carbon investment, highlighting key contributions from 
socio-technical thinking.   
3.1 Exploring uncertainty through coevolutionary pathways 
As outlined in section 2 there is a great degree of uncertainty and debate regarding the 
optimal technical configuration and investment cost of decarbonising the UK electricity grid, 
particularly in the medium and long term. A recently published report from the UK Energy 
Research Centre has begun to identify the range of political, economic and technological 
uncertainties which could slow down or potentially derail the UK’s low carbon transition 
(Watson et al., 2014). Key uncertainties are technological (relating to technology costs and 
system integration of renewables), economic (financial issues discussed above), natural 
resource availability, and political (what choices are made and by whom, public attitudes to 
different technology options) in their character. An understanding of the nature and origins 
of such uncertainty is of course critical in the context of investment in capital intensive 
assets where returns over the long duration of the investment need to be protected against 
uncertainty.  
In his history of ‘Great Transformations’ throughout the twentieth century, Blyth (2002) 
argues that structural change and economic crises are characterised by periods of 
“Knightian” uncertainty i.e. ‘situations in which agents cannot anticipate the outcome of a 
  
13 
 
 
decision and cannot assign probabilities to the outcome’ (Beckert, 1996). Under these 
circumstances conventional approaches to evaluating investment risk, for example based on 
financial appraisal methodologies which rely on an identification and measurement of risks, 
become problematic.  
Structural uncertainties at a system level which are influenced by policy and regulatory 
regimes tend to be poorly understood, one of the implications being that wider social risks 
and distributional effects are often poorly accounted for. There is therefore a need to think 
about uncertainties in an integrated and systemic way. In the past, scenario planning has 
been relied upon to explore the range of uncertainties influencing energy systems, 
particularly in the wake of the 1970s oil crises. However a recent review of low carbon 
scenarios, which are often based on conventional scenario methodologies, conducted by 
Hughes and Strachan (Hughes and Strachan, 2010) identified a number of shortcomings of 
such approaches; primarily an “over-reliance on constructs, notably exogenous emissions 
constraints and high level trends, which diminish the ability to understand how the various 
future scenarios could be brought about or avoided” (ibid: p.6065). Geels diagnoses two 
failures of traditional scenario methodologies (Geels, 2002a): 
1.  ‘an implicit linear model of technological development’ 
2. ‘undue emphasis on macro-logic and neglect of meso-logic’ 
A number of recent contributions to socio-technical studies have begun to develop new 
methodologies for scenario construction which are grounded in an appreciation of the 
interconnectedness of the social and technical and how future pathways of change are 
shaped by their coevolution. The method of socio-technical scenarios developed in the field 
has been deployed to examine how social and technical factors coevolve to shape 
alternative pathways of long term system change (Hofman and Elzen, 2010, Hofman et al., 
2004). Geels (2002a) argues that the method ‘can be particularly useful in ‘fluid’ and ‘hot’ 
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situations, i.e. when the dominance of existing technologies is challenged by newly 
emerging technologies’ (p.361). He goes on to argue that there is a need to think about 
scenarios in a multi-level way, incorporating the macro trends with an understanding of 
meso, or industry level, processes and specific micro level actor dynamics.  
This methodology has been deployed in a number of studies to develop insights for long 
term energy innovation policy (Verbong and Geels, 2008, Foxon, 2013, Shackley and Green, 
2007).These studies argue that the approach can contribute to a more realistic account of 
how the energy system might change over time. Drawing from the wider socio-technical 
literature, these types of scenarios take into account a number of complex processes and 
mechanisms including: 
 Co-evolutionary processes – new interactions of technologies, institutions, business 
strategies, ecosystems and end user practices (Foxon, 2011) 
 Multi-level interactions – how spaces of socio-technical reproduction (regimes) and 
transformation (niches) coexist and interact within a system, and are influenced by a 
wider system context (landscape) (Geels and Schot, 2007) 
 Actor dynamics – the role and relative influence of different market, government 
and civil society actors in shaping technical change (Foxon, 2013) 
These types of pathways could be used to explore investment uncertainty in a more 
structured and coherent way and how low carbon technology options might be constrained 
or enabled by wider governance and systemic factors.  
3.1.1 Illustration of pathways from the Transition Pathways project 
Taking these multi-actor/multi-level socio-technical processes as a basis for constructing 
alternative low carbon energy scenarios has been a central aim of the Transition Pathways 
project. A recent contribution by one of the authors (Foxon, 2013) draws on this 
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methodology to develop and analyse three ‘transition pathways’ for the UK electricity 
system out to 2050. The pathways were constructed through an iterative process, starting 
with a dialogue between the consortium members, incorporating insights from sociology, 
economics and engineering, and subsequently a number of stakeholder workshops were 
held in an effort to bring in expertise from industry actors and policy makers. The final 
stages of pathway construction involved an assessment of the technical feasibility of the 
scenarios (for a fuller technical assessment of the pathways see: Foxon, 2013, Barton et al., 
2013). 
The three pathways specific to the UK context which emerged are based on how different 
actor framings of a low carbon future, or governance ‘logics’, which represent alternative 
policy and regulatory contexts, might influence and shape key multi-level and 
co-evolutionary processes:  
 A ‘market rules’ pathway (figure 2a) where a liberalised market framework prevails 
in which large energy utilities are the dominant investors. The key policy mechanism 
is a carbon price and private actors make their investment decisions based on this 
constraint 
 A ‘Central coordination’ pathway (figure 2b) where national government exerts a 
strong influence over the energy system in order to deal with the ‘trilemma’ of 
addressing energy security, rising costs and achieving emissions reduction targets. 
Government intervention is characterised by the setting up of a Strategic Energy 
Agency; 
 A ‘thousand flowers’ pathway (figure 2c) which sees a more decentralised future as 
non-traditional investors in the energy system, such as cooperatives and local 
authorities, play a leading role in investing in low carbon technologies and energy 
efficiency programmes. 
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Each of the pathways involve different mixes of low carbon generation (nuclear, carbon 
capture and storage and renewables) which diffuse as old coal and nuclear plants close (cf. 
Figure 1) and CCGT is increasingly used as peaking plant rather than for base load. The 
graphs below, which are based on a quantitative assessment of the pathway narratives 
summarised above, illustrate the diffusion of selected key low carbon technologies in each 
of the pathways.  
Largely due to the increasing electrification of heat and transport, meeting the 2050 
decarbonisation target will necessitate a significant increase in installed capacity in 2050 
(Central Coordination – 140.5 GW, Market Rules - 173.7 GW, Thousand Flowers – 148.5 GW, 
compared to the current UK generating capacity of 90 GW). This highlights the scale of the 
investment challenge to be faced in the coming decades in not only replacing existing fossil 
fuel capacity with low carbon technologies, but also in enabling the increasing electrification 
of heat and transport sectors. 
In the central coordination pathway (figure 2a), a ‘technology push’ approach sees a focus 
on large scale centralised technologies such as nuclear, CCS and offshore wind. Market rules 
also sees a broadly centralised electricity system but with less reliance on nuclear power 
due to the lack of government backed long term contracts. Thousand flowers on the other 
hand sees a significant role for local and decentralised technologies such as CHP with district 
heating and small scale microgeneration technologies. 
Figures 2 (a), (b), and (c): Investment pathways for the UK power sector. Data from the Transitions Pathways 
Project. 
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3.1.2 Unpacking investment risk 
This approach of exploring radically different socio-technical configurations could allow 
actors to think in a more systemic way about the relationship between risk and 
uncertainties associated with alternative governance processes and actor alignments. 
Thinking in terms of long term integrated pathways, where a portfolio of technologies, 
rather than single projects, can be considered at a system level could also be useful in 
formulating effective policy measures. Here an important question for policy makers will be 
to understand how their decisions regarding the design of regulatory frameworks for 
infrastructure investment can influence and potentially help to manage investment risk.  
For large scale infrastructure systems, investment risk can be broken down into early stage 
financing & construction risks (e.g. planning delays, cost over runs, exchange rate 
fluctuations), technical/operational risks (e.g. risk of technical failure, higher than expected 
maintenance costs) and market risks (e.g. risk of lower than expected demand). Investors 
aim to quantify these risks in the light of future projections, but the risks are amplified by 
fundamental uncertainty over which, if any, low carbon pathway the county will follow. 
Investment risks therefore need to be understood in the context of these alternative 
socio-technical futures.   
In the central coordination pathway there is a strong reliance on nuclear technology. Recent 
experience with new nuclear builds in Finland and France has highlighted the high risk of 
cost overruns, therefore raising the construction risk in this pathway. Similarly construction 
risk is a concern for investors in offshore wind farms (PWC, 2010), which is an important 
technology in the central coordination and market rules pathways. A question for 
government is therefore whether specific policies are required to mitigate this construction 
risk e.g. by creating a bridging mechanism which spreads risk between private investors and 
taxpayers/customers during the early project phase. This will have implications for the type 
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of policies designed to attract finance, for example one of our interviewees noted that 
“some pension funds could be attracted to invest directly... [but] they would struggle with 
taking construction risk” (Interview 9). 
This form of construction risk is perhaps less a feature of the more distributed thousand 
flowers pathway. However, market risk may become a more significant challenge in this 
pathway. This is because there is falling demand due to successful energy efficiency 
measures, many competing generators in the market, and a strong reliance on government 
subsidies in the form of feed-in tariffs. These market risks may lead to boom-bust 
investment cycles and create instability in the electricity sector. Mitigating this risk could 
necessitate a radically redesigned electricity market structure and a stronger political 
commitment to renewable support than has previously been displayed on the part of 
government.  
3.2 Understanding transition dynamics and the timing of investment decisions 
The discussion above highlights the implications of structural uncertainty in how low carbon 
transition pathways will evolve, in terms of new technologies, governance arrangements 
and actor roles. Operating in the midst of this uncertainty is of course an issue for 
government in setting long term regulatory frameworks, and private actors in making 
commercial investment decisions. This is difficult because infrastructure investments have 
long time horizons and in many cases investment decisions need to be made in the short 
term to meet immediate policy and economic goals, raising the risk of lock-in to potentially 
undesirable long term trajectories. The second area that socio-technical research can inform 
policy is how an understanding of path dependency and non-linearity in transition pathways 
can help to overcome this lock-in. 
The wider technology studies literature on path dependency and lock-in (Arthur, 1989, 
David, 1985, Unruh, 2000) argues that technical change is not merely the product of an 
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engineering or economic rationality, rather ‘timing, strategy and historic circumstance, as 
much as optimality, determine the winner’ (Unruh, 2000). Historical studies (David, 1985) 
and modelling exercises (Arthur, 1989, Arthur, 1994) have highlighted how events and 
decisions made in the early stages of technological diffusion can be amplified and have 
enduring effects as ‘winning’ technologies, or dominant designs, benefit from positive 
feedbacks such as economies of scale, learning effects, adaptive expectations, and network 
effects as systems expand and become increasingly interconnected. These mechanisms can 
create a situation of lock-in, arising from the co-evolution of technologies with their wider 
institutional environment, which can in turn condition future decision making and constrain 
the scope for radical innovation (Unruh, 2000).  
The transitions literature characterises this process of lock-in and path dependency in terms 
of socio-technical regimes (Geels, 2004) which are underpinned by strong inter-relationships 
between institutions, user practises, business strategies and infrastructures. Viewed 
through the lens of path dependency and lock-in, the evolution of regimes can be 
characterised by a number of distinct phases (Rotmans et al., 2001, Loorbach, 2007): a 
predevelopment phase characterised by gradual change and experimentation, with many 
competing technologies, a take-off phase with more evidence of structural changes where 
mechanisms of lock-in begin to take effect, an acceleration phase where dominant designs 
emerge and structural changes become more deeply embedded, and finally a stabilization 
phase where a new system state is reached and emphasis is on optimising the existing 
regime through incremental innovations. Of course this framework simplifies a more 
complex and messy reality where different phases of transition are not neatly defined and 
sequential, and the borders between one phase and the next are impossible to delineate. 
However, as a theoretical construct, it may provide a structured way of thinking through the 
policy and investment challenge of having to make near term investment decisions in the 
midst of uncertainty and which will have long term implications.  
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The energy transition in the UK is likely in the predevelopment phase or the early stages of 
the take-off phase as ambitious decarbonisation and renewable deployment targets have 
been put in place and structural changes to the electricity sector are beginning to be 
implemented. Winskel and Radcliffe (2014) have characterised the emergence of an 
‘accelerated innovation’ imperative in the UK where the priorities of the energy innovation 
system is shifting away from diversity and the development of niche technologies, to 
achieving cost reductions in large scale technology programmes such as CCS and offshore 
wind, in order to achieve near term climate change targets. During this period the main 
priority is on the decarbonisation of the electricity grid, which according to the Committee 
on Climate Change will need to occur relatively rapidly by 2030, and following this a 
decarbonisation of the entire energy system will need to take place, incorporating the heat 
and transport sectors. As was outlined in section two, rapid power grid decarbonisation is 
seen as a first step primarily because there are a number of relatively mature low carbon 
options available (wind and nuclear), and in any case the UK will need to replace a number 
of its ageing coal, nuclear and gas plants over the coming decade. The technology options 
for decarbonising heat and transport are not so apparent and as a result there is much less 
certainty as to how the post-2030 acceleration phase will proceed. Creating a smooth 
transition from the predevelopment and take-off phase of power sector decarbonisation to 
the subsequent acceleration phase where the entire energy system becomes low carbon is 
therefore key. The priority in the take-off phase is to develop investment strategies which 
help to ‘future proof’ the energy system by keeping options open as much as possible i.e. 
that do not close down the opportunities for niche innovations to become more widely 
diffused in the future. Also, in this phase the new skills, expertise, industrial capacity and 
supply chains which will also be required in the acceleration phase, will need to be 
developed. 
Transition studies points to the danger of lock-in to sub-optimal long term pathways if 
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decisions are made solely based on narrow short term criteria, e.g. the need to plug a gap in 
electricity generation capacity or to meet renewable energy targets for 2020, without 
building the necessary foundations required for a more fundamental transformation in the 
medium and long term. For example, a key argument for a 2030 electricity decarbonisation 
target is that this would help to stimulate the development of a renewables supply chain in 
the UK (Parr, 2013). A number of our interviewees identified the need to develop a UK 
manufacturing base in renewable technologies, with one interviewee from a large energy 
supplier noting that this is an immediate issue in particular for offshore wind: “demand for 
offshore wind is so strong that the capability of suppliers to meet that demand are being 
stretched to the limit, in some cases beyond the limit. So sometimes the capabilities in the 
supply chain are dictating the pace of the development, rather than demand” (Interview 2). 
This suggests the need to develop alternative criteria which can help to evaluate 
investments aside from narrow short term economic ones. For example there may be 
certain strategic investments which help future proof the system for the post 2030 phase 
and create synergies across the transport, heat and electricity sectors. Taylor et al. (2013) 
argue that energy storage technologies fit into this category as they can help to manage a 
highly distributed and intermittent low carbon energy system, while Hawkey et al. (2013) 
argue for more emphasis on local scale infrastructure investments centred on the efficient 
provision of low carbon heat. However under current market structures the revenue 
streams to investors in these technologies which promote flexibility and efficiency are highly 
uncertain as their benefits are not specific to one particular segment of the market but 
diffused across the entire system, and are therefore more difficult to account for under 
current market arrangements (Bolton and Foxon, 2013b, Bolton and Foxon, 2014, Taylor et 
al., 2013, Bolton and Foxon, 2011). Addressing these deficiencies of energy markets and 
overcoming barriers to the diffusion of long term strategic investments will likely be key to 
moving into the acceleration phase.  
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3.3 Opening up the investment actor space: Thinking beyond incumbents and 
creating diversity in LC finance  
To date most of the low carbon investment in the electricity sector has been financed off 
the corporate balance sheets of the major utilities – in the UK the ‘big six’ energy utilities 
dominate the market. However, some influential actors within the business and investment 
community claim that this incumbent investment model may be inadequate to deliver low 
carbon investment required (CBI, 2011, PWC, 2010). There are two reasons for this: the first 
is that there is simply not sufficient financial capacity amongst the large utility companies in 
the UK (and most probably across Europe) who dominate the energy market to deliver the 
scale of the investment required under the timescales imposed by decarbonisation targets 
through traditional financing mechanisms. The second is the increasingly challenging 
business environment that large European utility companies now operate in where demand 
growth has stalled due to the economic slowdown. Also, unexpected energy policy 
developments have created uncertainty in the wider European energy market and in some 
cases has damaged incumbent utility balance sheets, most notably the German policy of 
accelerated nuclear shutdown and Spain’s decision to retroactively reduce renewable 
electricity subsidies. In their 2011 National Infrastructure Plan (HM Treasury, 2011) the UK 
Treasury noted that “the principle sources of private finance for the UK’s existing 
infrastructure pipeline – the balance sheets of utility companies and commercial banks – 
may face growing pressure in the medium and long term” (p.97).  
In a recently published report investigating the issue from a UK perspective by Blyth et al. 
(2014) it was noted that: “Traditional utility companies have recently faced difficult market 
conditions, with significant demand destruction across Europe as a result of the recession, 
leading to excess capacity and low margins. In the 2000s, utilities took on much higher debt 
levels to fund mergers and acquisitions across Europe. Energy companies are now 
attempting to de-leverage their balance sheets in order to maintain reasonable credit 
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ratings and access to the low-cost bonds and shares on which their business model 
depends. This constrains their ability to raise debt to cover increased investment” (p.iv). 
Emphasising this dilemma, an interviewee from one of the large UK utilities stated that 
“we’ve all suffered with the last few years, everyone’s balance sheets have suffered and 
nobody…is in a position to massively finance new programmes…This is a massive 
unparalleled level of investment. I think that that is a very very tricky situation to work 
though” (Interview 13). Blyth et al. (2014) highlight that the real challenge may come in the 
UK in the post-2020 period where, in order to meet ambitious decarbonisation goals under 
the fourth and subsequent carbon budgets, a rapid scale up of low carbon finance will be 
required and there may be a need to diversify the sources of low carbon finance. 
3.3.1 Can government foster low carbon finance ‘niches’? 
Historical studies of previous phases of structural change have highlighted the role of 
government in aligning capital flows with long term innovation processes. The work of 
Carlota Perez for example has emphasised that the issue of redirecting financial capital to 
more productive ends has been a recurrent feature of the capitalist system following 
financial and economic crises. Once realignment between technology and finance is 
achieved, Perez argues, there is potential for a ‘golden age’ where financial capital supports 
the development of productive technological systems, enabling in the past significant 
investment programmes in infrastructures such as canals, railways, and telecommunications 
(Perez, 2002, Perez, 2013). However, because low carbon investment will need to be policy 
driven rather than by benefits to private investors, as has historically been the case (Pearson 
and Foxon, 2012; Perez, 2013), significant uncertainties remain as to how large scale 
investment which contributes to the societal goal of reducing carbon emissions can be 
brought about. In line with socio-technical studies, there may be a role for government 
intervention to facilitate and grow new and innovative forms of finance. The transitions 
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approach emphasises the need to develop and foster ‘niche’ spaces or incubation rooms for 
radical innovation which, although may be underdeveloped and uncompetitive against 
incumbent technologies, have the potential to diffuse and alter mainstream regimes further 
down the line (Raven, 2005, Coenen et al., 2010). These arguments may be equally as 
applicable to the ways in which low carbon infrastructure is financed, as it is to the 
technological innovations themselves.  
Of course, large energy companies will continue to play an important role, particularly in 
delivering large renewable projects, CCS and nuclear as they have significant knowledge and 
expertise in developing large and complex infrastructure projects. However, increasingly 
attention is being drawn towards alternative sources of finance. Below we outline four 
potential low carbon finance ‘niches’ which have been identified through our discussions 
with interviewees: 
 Energy cooperatives are perhaps the most established form of alternative energy 
financing, dating back to the early development of wind energy in Denmark. This is 
primarily an equity based approach where ownership is confined to members who 
hold shares in the cooperative, the principle being that those who benefit from the 
cooperative control it. In the UK, cooperatives have tended to be community based 
investment in small scale wind farms, and in recent years, following the introduction 
of dedicated feed-in tariffs for microgeneration, they have supported the building of 
small and medium scale solar installations. 
 Energy service companies (ESCos), unlike incumbent utilities base their business 
model on the provision of energy services in the most efficient way possible, and in 
some cases use the projected returns from efficiency savings to finance new 
investments. A UK based ESCo, Thamesway Energy, which is wholly owned by 
Woking borough council, partly financed investments in CHP plants and district 
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heating infrastructure by savings from energy efficiency measures. Private 
companies also operate in this space by providing energy performance contracting 
to customers, meaning that customers can install technologies such as domestic 
microgeneration at little or no upfront capital cost (Hannon et al., 2013) 
 Forms of investment disintermediation where financial intermediaries such as banks 
and investment funds are bypassed in the investment process have gained increasing 
attention following the financial crisis. There is one example in the UK of such 
activity in the renewable energy sector; Abundance Generation7, who are attempting 
to directly link individual retail investors with project developers. In this case the 
developer retains ownership of the scheme but issues debt debentures to raise 
finance, which are not listed on a stock exchange but sold to individuals who can 
subsequently sell them on. 
 The final financing niche we point to are new ways of engaging institutional 
investors. The question of how to engage with and attract institutional investors, 
primarily pension and insurance funds, into the low carbon sector has become an 
increasingly central part of mainstream energy policy debates in the UK, and there 
has been much discussion surrounding the potential role that innovative financing 
mechanisms such as green infrastructure bonds could play in this. These types of 
investor who hold large pools of capital would not traditionally have invested in the 
electricity generation sector. However, the long term nature and potential for 
predictable returns which are protected against inflation are attractive for these 
investors, particularly for maturing pension funds. As discussed previously, it will be 
critical to allocate investment risk between private investors, customers and 
                                                        
7 https://www.abundancegeneration.com/about/ 
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taxpayers in an equitable manner and to engender greater confidence in the long 
term prospects for low carbon investments. Blyth et al (2014) note: “there does 
seem to be a growing appetite amongst institutional investors to put more money 
into infrastructure funds, and some estimates suggest that the amount of money 
available could increase by a factor of 2 or 3 (up to $6.5tn)” (p.vii). 
The literature on niches for sustainable innovation highlights three key areas of niche 
governance that require attention (Smith et al., 2013, Smith and Raven, 2012): The first is 
niche shielding where radical innovations are protected from the prevailing market or 
‘selection environment’, e.g. through subsidies, the second is nurturing where the 
development and growth of innovations is enabled, and the third is empowering where 
niches begin to interact with and influence the incumbent regime. These aspects of 
governing niche innovation will have different implications for the examples outlined above. 
For example, energy cooperatives where shareholders retain direct control are likely to be 
limited in the size of projects they can develop and will rely strongly on forms of 
government subsidy for small scale decentralised technologies such as feed-in tariffs for 
their long term survival. On the other hand, approaches which engage with institutional 
investors and the wider capital markets are potentially more scalable and closely aligned 
with the incumbent regime rules and technologies. In this case, the focus of policy should be 
on short term intervention, playing a catalytic role and increasing investor confidence, with 
the expectation that the niche will rapidly become self-sustaining.  
In 2012 the UK Government initiated a Green Investment Bank, a public organisation to 
stimulate investment in the low carbon sector. A more in-depth review is required to 
explore the extent to which such public lending institutions can accelerate the scaling up 
and diffusion of different forms of non-traditional ownership and financing, and the ways in 
which policy can protect and nurture these niches in appropriate ways, encouraging new 
forms of learning in this area.  
  
28 
 
 
4 Discussion and reflection on policy contributions 
In this section we reflect on the nature of the contribution that socio-technical systems 
analysis can make it in providing an overarching framework for the development of energy 
policy in relation to low carbon investment.  
Recent analyses of energy policy and politics in the UK have suggested that economic 
theories and methods have been extremely influential in formulating and structuring the 
market based paradigm of energy governance in the UK since the 1980s (Kern et al., 2013).    
In this sense economic theory has played a performative role (Mackenzie et al., 2007, 
Callon, 1998), not only has it sought to understand the structure and functioning of energy 
markets, it has played an important role in initially designing them and bringing them into 
being. It seems increasingly clear however that this economics based model is incapable of 
delivering the type of low carbon investment required over the necessary timescales, and 
that government needs to step in to redirect and channel finance into the sector. 
Considering the influential role that neo-classical economics played in bringing into being 
the last radical socio-technical shift in UK energy – privatisation and liberalisation - it may be 
the case that there is scope for a new and renewed dialogue between academic discourse 
and policy. 
In reflecting on the contributions from socio-technical systems studies outlined, the 
strength of the approach may be in providing overarching frameworks based on a systems 
understanding, rather than guidelines on specific short interventions. The nature of this 
type of relationship between technology studies and policy has been outlined by Russell and 
Williams (2002) who argue that the field ‘can make a significant contribution to the current 
rethinking of approaches to technology policy: in general through a reconceptualising of its 
key problems and concerns, and specifically formulating or improving particular forms of 
policy analysis and practice’ (p.146). Russell and Williams argue that this new form of policy 
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informed by technology studies will be different in that it ‘does not feed into policy-making 
in a single and simple way…It is highly unlikely that its use will be direct and instrumental in 
the manner depicted by technocratic policy models’ (Russell and Williams, 2002: p.146). A 
more nuanced understanding of the social character of technical change and the non-linear 
and complex dynamics of innovation processes can help policy makers ‘to identify possible 
points of intervention’ and assess the ‘the dynamics of policy intervention’ e.g. in relation to 
innovation outcomes (ibid. p.146).  
A danger of course of focusing on long term socio-technical processes and speaking in terms 
of system level frameworks is that the real world, day-to-day messiness of socio-technical 
change is glossed over. For example the ideal type governance logics discussed in section 
3.1 – government, market and civil society – do not exist in isolation, rather socio-technical 
change will be politically negotiated, the transition pathway taken will be shaped by conflict 
and forms of alignment between these worldviews.  
Insights can be drawn here from recent contributions to the political economy of energy 
systems and structural change (Kuzemko and Bradshaw, 2013, Newell and Mulvaney, 2013, 
Bradshaw, 2010). Areas of increasing politicisation in the UK in relation to energy 
investment, such as rising energy bills and contestation surrounding different technology 
options e.g. shale gas, nuclear power etc., are shaped by trade-offs between long term 
decarbonisation goals and shorter-term objectives relating to security of supply and 
affordability of energy services, which may be perceived as more pressing by policy makers. 
Elsewhere (Foxon, 2013) one of the authors has characterised this arena of conflict and 
negotiation in terms of an ‘action space’ between government, civil society and market 
governance logics. Powerful actors enrol others into their worldview, alliances are formed 
leading to the dominance of one logic, or the formation of hybrid pathways (Bolton and 
Foxon, 2013a).  
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More empirically grounded research could explore in more depth how ongoing actor 
dynamics and political processes might influence investment decisions and the implications 
for long term trajectories of socio-technical change. 
5 Conclusions  
In this paper we highlighted how the extant literature on socio-technical systems can be 
operationalised to address important questions on the role of policy in effectively mobilising 
finance to achieve low carbon objectives in the UK electricity sector. In the sections above 
we have illustrated a number of ways in which the basis for policy making in this area could 
be enhanced: Firstly, by developing long term energy scenarios for the analysis of 
investment risk and uncertainty which are sensitive to actor dynamics and structural 
changes in the system of governance; secondly, by sensitising policy interventions to the 
dynamics of long term transition processes in an effort to explore options and improve the 
potential for innovative solutions; and, thirdly, by emphasising the need to foster diversity 
and learning processes in the area of financial innovation.  
In the UK, as in other countries, new policy frameworks are required to guide the transition 
from an energy governance model centred on achieving short term efficiencies through 
market operation, to a long term approach which is resilient and adaptive in the face of new 
uncertainties. We have argued that socio-technical systems frameworks, combined with 
empirical analysis, can provide useful frameworks to address these types of questions and 
inform wider societal debates on low carbon investment options.  
 
6 Appendix: List of interviewees and dates 
1. Head of Sustainability at a large investment fund. 14-1-2013 
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2. Head of renewables policy at a major UK energy utility. 15-1-2013 
3. Company secretary of an energy cooperative. 25-1-2013 
4. Managing Director of energy innovation at a major UK energy utility. 24-1-2013 
5. Head of Advisory at a specialist environmental investment group. 11-2-2013 
6. Partner at an advisory firm specialising in private equity and infrastructure investments. 
4-2-2013 
7. Co-founder and director of an investment company specialising in small scale 
renewables. 5-2-2013 
8. Partner and Head of Sustainability Research at an investment group specialising in 
sustainability. 6-2-2013 
9. Investment Director at a European investment Fund specialising in energy, climate 
change and infrastructure. 25-2-2013 
10. Individual renewable energy project developer. 28-2-2013 
11. CEO of a NGO which campaigns for sustainable investment practices in the pensions 
sector. 6-2-2013 
12. CEO of an investment industry professional body promoting sustainable investment 
practices. 4-4-2013 
13. Senior member of the commercial department of a major UK energy utility. 5-4-2013 
14. Employee in the Investor Relations team of an energy related government agency. 
14-6-2013 
15. Senior civil servant working on renewable deployment. 9-8-2013 
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